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Abstract: In the nine years since its launch, amid intense research, scalability is always a serious
concern in blockchain, especially in case of large-scale network generating huge number of
transaction-records. In this paper, we propose a hierarchical blockchain model characterized by:
(1) each level maintains multiple local blockchain networks, (2) each local blockchain records local
transactional activities, and (3) partial views (tunable w.r.t. precision) of different subsets of local
blockchain-records are maintained in the blockchains at next level of the hierarchy. To meet this
objective, we apply abstractions on a set of transaction-records in a regular time interval by following
the Abstract Interpretation framework, which provides a tunable precision in various abstract domain
and guarantees the soundness of the system. While this model suitably fits to the real-worlds
organizational structures, the proposal is powerful enough to scale when large number of nodes
participate in a network resulting into an enormous growth of the network-size and the number of
transaction-records. We discuss experimental results on a small-scale network with three sub networks
at lower-level and by abstracting the transaction-records in the abstract domain of intervals. The results
are encouraging and clearly indicate the effectiveness of this approach to control exponential growth
of blockchain size w.r.t. the total number of participants in the network.
Keywords: blockchain; abstract interpretation; hierarchical model
1. Introduction
Since the pioneer work by Satoshi Nakamoto in 2008 [1], Blockchain has emerged as a revolutionary
technology with numerous applications in practice, including cryptocurrency, food safety, IoT security,
healthcare, and many more [2,3]. Blockchain is essentially an append-only data structure (in the form
of sequence of blocks) containing complete list of transaction-records, like conventional public ledger,
which is maintained by multiple non-trusting members connected via a decentralized peer-to-peer
network. Such distributed ledger provides a powerful mean to verify records, without any trusted
intermediary such as brokers, agents, etc. [4,5].
Although blockchain technology has great potential to transform most industries, but at this
nascent stage it is facing a number of technical challenges. The most serious challenge is scalability [6,7].
In the age of big data, as blockchain network size increases day by day, the amount of transaction-records
generated in the network also increases rapidly. This yields a growth of blockchain size at the same
pace due to its append-only tamper-evident structure. Managing such huge sized blockchain by the
network nodes in a distributed setting is of course a matter of concern. This may gradually lead to
a centralized situation as less users would like to maintain such a large blockchain [8]. For example,
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the size of the Bitcoin blockchain has been growing since its creation in 2009, reaching approximately
197 gigabytes in size by the beginning of January 2019. Currently the Bitcoin network is able to process
nearly 7 transactions per second due to its block-size limitation upto 1 MB with a 10 min mining
gap [9]. This clearly indicates the inability of dealing high frequency trading, compared to PayPal or
visa. On the other hand, increase of block size limit may cause propagation delay in the network and
may lead to branches in the blockchain [10]. As more users incur more transactions it takes longer for
verification with waiting times increasing sharply at peak times, and thereby reduces the operational
efficiency gradually in the network.
Furthermore, as most organizational structures are hierarchical in general, this causes a severe
limitation when to adopt blockchain-based solution in order to fulfill organizational needs.
Although private blockchain may protect information from outsider, however there is no specific
mechanism to impose access control enabling data-access differently to different groups across the
hierarchy within the same organization. The only possible way to enforce access control is to deploy
smart contract specifying policy specification, which is of course a tedious and error-prone task [11,12].
To ameliorate such bottlenecks, in this paper, we propose a hierarchical blockchain model where
each level maintains multiple local blockchain-networks, each of which records local transactional
activities, and partial views (tunable w.r.t. precision) of different subsets of local blockchain-records are
maintained in the blockchains at next level of the hierarchy. Figure 1 depicts a large-scale network in
a hierarchical fashion involving stakeholders across the globe. The green circles indicate lowest level
blockchain networks, while the red circles indicate data management at a higher level of the hierarchy.
Figure 1. Decentralized network views at various levels of hierarchy.
While this makes the system scalable enough by allowing at each level multiple local blockchains
(rather than single one at a global level) as a way to reduce overall network activities, alongside such
views also facilitate to control the access of blockchains (and hence blockchain records) differently to
different groups of people or processes as per their access rights. To this aim, we extend the Abstract
Interpretation framework [13] to provide a sound approximation of blockchain-records across the
hierarchical levels, making them tunable w.r.t. precision in various abstract domains ranging from
non-relational to relational. The use of Abstract Interpretation framework in our approach guarantees
soundness of blockchain operations (for example, Auditability) due to systematic constructions of
abstractions following Galois connection under the framework. In particular, we address the following
two important aspects: (1) architecture of the networking model by moving from a mesh to a hierarchical
structure, and (2) precision control of blockchain-records across the levels of the hierarchy by abstracting
sets of data.
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The prime intuition behind our proposal is to deal locally-generated information separately in the
form of local blockchains which reduces performance bottleneck significantly, and to abstract these
local blockchain-records in the next level of the hierarchy with precision control. For instance, if a travel
agency H reserves seats 1A, 1B, 1C, 2A, 2B, 2C, 3A, 3C for personnel of the same firm N, instead of adding
to the ledger all eight transactions <H, N, 1A>, . . . , <H, N, 3C>, an abstract representation like <H, N,
[1,2][A,B], [1,3][A,C]> may under- and over-approximate this set of transactions. Although blockchain
provides a transparent mean to validate transactions, there are several scenarios where a number of
participants in the network do not require exact information and the answer in the form of “yes” or
“no” is sufficient during the verification process. For instance, in case of ledger containing insurance
records, traffic police may expect a decisive answer when he/she verifies if a person is insured with
an amount in a specific range.
A schematic diagram of our proposed model organizing blockchains in a hierarchical fashion
is depicted in Figure 2, where BCi represents blockchains at the hierarchy level i. Observe that BC2
contains an abstract representation (partial view) of all the transaction-records in the blockchains BC1.
Bc1 Bc2
Bc2 Bc2
Bc1 Bc1
Bc3
Bc1
Bc1
Bc1
Bc1
Bc1
Bc1
Bc1
Bc1
Bc1
Figure 2. Schematic diagram of hierarchical blockchains model.
To summarize, the main contributions in this paper are:
• We propose a hierarchical blockchain model as a way to improve scalability in case of large-scale
blockchain network.
• The proposal involves data abstractions across the levels of the hierarchy, by extending the
Abstract Interpretation theory [13]. This ensures the soundness of the blockchain operations,
with a precision control at different levels of abstractions.
• We illustrate how such model fits into real-world organizational scenarios, providing access
control differently to different groups of people or processes in a system as per their access rights.
• Finally, we implement the proposal by considering only interval abstraction, and we demonstrate
the results showing the variation of blockchain size at different hierarchical level w.r.t. mining delay.
The structure of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 illustrates a motivating example.
Section 3 discusses related works in the literature. We recall the basics on the Abstract Interpretation
theory in Section 4. The detail proposal on the hierarchical blockchain model is described in Section 5.
An implementation of our proposed approach and the experimental results in the domain of intervals
Appl. Sci. 2019, 9, 2343 4 of 20
are reported in Section 6. We provide a detail discussions on the proposal w.r.t. the literature in
Section 7. Finally, we conclude our work in Section 8.
2. A Motivating Example
Let us consider a multinational insurance company which is expanded over a number of countries
across the globe. The company is associated, directly or indirectly, with many stakeholders, including
its own employees, country’s road and transport department, traffic polices, empanelled hospitals,
common people, and many others. To facilitate operations like insurance record verification, insurance
claims, etc., researchers have already proposed a number of blockchain-based solutions [14–16]. This is
to observe that, in all these cases, the proposed systems are somehow dependent on either local
database or third-party cloud storage to store insurance data. This is due to the fact that maintenance of
a single blockchain and populating it with large volume of insurance data which is generated everyday
across the globe may eventually slowdown the performance of the whole system, as its size grows.
Interestingly, there are many situations when exact details of the data may not be required to
answer queries issued by the stakeholders. For example, a traffic police needs to verify whether a car
owner has valid insurance, an insurance company needs to verify whether the person already has
Mediclaim policy with any other company, etc. A common objective in all such cases is to obtain
a decisive answer in the form of “yes” or “no” and the presence of insurance data in an abstract form
(representing specific properties of interest) in the blockchain fulfills such functional requirements.
This leads to a significant reduction of the overall size of the blockchain in the system, improving its
performance thereof.
Inspired from these facts, in the subsequent sections, we propose a hierarchical blockchain model
where multiple blockchains at different levels representing data in various forms, from concrete
(lowest level of the hierarchy) to abstract (towards higher levels), are considered. Such model may act
as a powerful solution to deal with scalability, access control, data sharing, etc.
3. Related Works
Blockchain over recent years has been extolled as a revolution in business technology [17]. In the
nine years since its launch, an intensive research in the field has proved its immense potential in a wide
range of applications, ranging from new land registries, KYC applications, e-commerce, insurance,
supply chain, and many more [18]. The most impressive results have seen blockchains used to store
information, cut out intermediaries, and enable greater coordination between companies, for example
in relation to data standards. Detail survey on blockchain covering the technology along with its
possible applications and challenges are found in [6,19,20].
In this section, we mainly restrict our discussion to the scalability issue of blockchain. The authors
in [6] identified various challenges which create major hindrance in the future pathway of blockchain
technology. They emphasize the scalability issue as one such concern when to deal with large-scale
decentralized network and big data. As a solution, they refer two different approaches: Storage
optimization of blockchain [21] and Redesigning blockchain [22]. In the first approach, the author
suggested to prune out old transactions from the blockchain network to deal with scalability.
Only information about non-empty transactions are maintained, offering benefits such as faster
transactions, lower fees, more blockspace, faster network synchronization, etc. The second approach [22]
introduces a new blockchain protocol, Bitcoin-NG (Next Generation), aiming to scale bitcoin network,
with bandwidth limited only by the capacity of the individual nodes and latency limited only by the
propagation time of the network.
The authors in [23] proposed a new blockchain storage “Mystiko” which is built over Apache
Cassandra database. The main aim is to deal with big data. The authors claims that Mystiko supports
the important properties like transaction throughput, high scalability, high availability and other text
retrieval features. We observed that, although the support of distributed storages (like Cassendra)
successfully stores bigdata in blockchain, however they need highly equipped nodes in the network.
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Two other works which also support such kind of architecture are BigchainDB which is built on
MongoDB [24] and HBasechainDB which is based on HBase with Hadoop [25].
The authors in [26] introduced the notion of overlay network where a number of chosen cluster
head maintains a separate blockchain, in addition to the local blockchains. The main objective of this
proposal is to ensure IoT privacy and security by eliminating the overhead of computationally expensive
blockchain management due to high bandwidth requirement and possible delays. Although the
approach is quite similar to our case, but the network structure is only limited to two-level hierarchy
and therefore it is not scalable enough in practice. Paper [27] addressed the issue of data boundary
conflicts in Land Registration using blockchain. The Land Registry and Cadastre (LR & C) blockchain
database component of a node considers three levels in a hierarchy. This is immediate to claim
that the proposed architecture is very specific to this application and does not address scalability.
Recently another related work is proposed in [28] which focuses exclusively IoT systems that keep
user’s key information, and hence may not fit to other scenario in general. They discriminate
the participants, categorizing into device-layer, fog-layer and cloud-layer nodes, with a varying
computational capabilities. The task of each layer nodes are predefined. For Example, the fog-layer
nodes which lie in between device-layer and cloud layer, act as security manager to record and verify
transactions that include key management information in this respective domain. Cloud-nodes are
highly capable to manage and function multiple blockchains. Although the proposal is suitable for
cross domain communications respecting privacy issues, it does not address any scalability issue in
presence of large-scale nodes in the peer-to-peer network.
In [7], the author introduced a distributed access control model for blockchain in case of large-scale
IoT systems consisting of billions devices over the globe. The access control policy is defined in smart
contract deployed in the blockchain. The important components facilitating this access control in
a distributed way are the introduction of access control manager nodes (light weight) and management
hub nodes (high computation nodes) in the network. Observe that the model is suitable only for private
blockchain network. As nodes can easily participate in the network globally, it may be a cumbersome
and error-prone task to define access control policy for the large numbers of IoT devices.
There are several other proposals which address access control in blockchain network by
incorporating access-control policies in the form of smart contracts [11,12,29]. However, in these
proposals, all nodes form a single level blockchain network.
4. Preliminaries: Abstract Interpretation
Abstract Interpretation [13] is a mathematical framework, originally introduced by Cousot and
Cousot in 1977, which provides a sound approximation of programs concrete semantics enabling
sound answers to questions about programs run-time behaviors. The framework has been applied to
different applications areas, from Security (e.g., [30,31]) to Databases (e.g., [32,33]), and to different
programming environments (e.g., [34–36]). The idea is to lift concrete semantics to an abstract setting
by replacing concrete values by suitable properties of interest, and simulating the concrete operations
by sound abstract operations. The concrete and the abstract domains are always partial orders,
where the ordering relation describes the relative precision of the denotations and where the top
element represents no information. The mapping between concrete and abstract semantics domains is
established by Galois connection:
Definition 1 (Galois connections [13]). Consider two partial orders (D, 6) and (D, v) where the first one
represents a concrete domain and the second one represents an abstract domain.The Galois connection between D
and D is denoted by
〈
(D,6), α, γ, (D,v)
〉
or (D, 6)
α−→←−−
γ
(D, v) where α: D→ D and γ: D→ D holds iff:
• ∀v ∈ D. v v γ ◦ α(v).
• ∀v ∈ D. α ◦ γ(v) v v.
• α and γ are monotonic.
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In other words, iff ∀v ∈ D, v ∈ D. α(v) v v ⇐⇒ v 6 γ(v).
For example, given a domain of integers Z, we can establish a Galois connection
〈
(℘(Z),⊆),
α,γ, (SIGN,v)
〉
between the concrete domain ℘(Z), the powerset of Z, and an abstract domain
SIGN={>,+,−, 0,±, 0+, 0−,⊥} representing sign properties of numerical values, depicted in Figure 3.
∅
{ 1} { 2 } { 3 } . . .{ 0 }{ -1 }. . .
{-1,0} {0, 1} {1, 2} {2, 3}
. . . . . .
{-1,0,1} {1,2,3}
. . .. . . . . . . . .
Z
α
γ
⊥
0 -+
±0+ 0-
>
Figure 3. Galois connection between ℘(Z) and SIGN.
The abstraction function α and concretization function γ between the domains are defined below:
∀X ∈ ℘(Z) : α(S)=

⊥ if S = ∅
+ if S = { a | a > 0 }
0 if S = { 0 }
− if S = { a | a < 0 }
± if S = { a | a > 0 ∨ a < 0 }
0+ if S = { a | a > 0 }
0− if S = { a | a 6 0 }
> Otherwise
∀v ∈ SIGN: γ(v)=

∅ if v = ⊥
{k ∈ Z | k > 0} if v = +
{0} if v = 0
{k ∈ Z | k < 0} if v = −
{k ∈ Z | k > 0∨ k < 0} if v = ±
{k ∈ Z | k > 0} if v = 0+
{k ∈ Z | k 6 0} if v = 0−
Z Otherwise
The arithmetic operations over the abstract domain are defined accordingly, ensuring the soundness
w.r.t. their concrete counter-part [37]. For example, the ‘×’ operation over the concrete domain is
mapped to its abstract version ‘×]’ as follows: −(×])− = +, +(×])− = −, +(×])+ = +, >(×])+ = >,
⊥(×])+ = ⊥, and so on.
A number of abstract domains, non-relational and relational, exist in the literature [13,37–40].
4.1. Non-Relational Abstract Domains
An abstract domain is said to be non-relational if it does not preserve any relations among
program variables. Non-relational abstract domains care only about the actual variables being updated,
rather than having potential to change multiple values at once [37]. Some widely used non-relational
abstract domains for program analysis include sign domain for sign property analysis, parity domain
for parity property analysis, interval domain for division-by-zero or overflows, etc. [13]. Analysis in
these domains, although effective, is less precise w.r.t. relational abstract domains. Figure 4 pictorially
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depicts a scenario where a set of points SP (indicated by •) on the xy-plane are abstracted by sign and
interval properties.
x
y
•
•
• •
•
•
•
•
•
• •
•
x
y
•
•
• •
•
•
•
•
•
• •
•
Figure 4. Abstraction of SP by Sign and Interval Properties.
4.2. Relational Abstract Domains
Unlike non-relational abstract domains, the relational abstract domains preserve relations among
program variables [38]. Analysis in these domains are more precise as compared to the non-relational
abstract domains, in particular when more number of relations among variables are present in
the code itself. Widely used relational abstract domains are the domains of Polyhedra, Octagons,
Difference-Bound Matrices (DBM), etc. [38–40]. Abstraction of the same set of points in Octagon and
Polyhedra domains are exemplified in Figure 5.
x
y
•
•
• •
•
•
•
•
•
• •
•
x
y
•
•
• •
•
•
•
•
•
• •
•
Figure 5. Abstraction of SP in Octagon and Polyhedra Domains.
5. Hierarchical Blockchain Model
In this section, we detail our proposal. To do so, we first describe an abstraction of concrete blocks
in a blockchain and then we describe the mining process of the abstract blocks to the blockchain in the
next hierarchical level.
5.1. Block Structure and Data Abstraction
In general, information in blocks of a blockchain are categorized into the followings:
• Block-specific Information: This information includes block identifier, version, hash of the block
header, etc.
• Block-header Information: This section of information contains hash pointer of the previous block,
mining details (such as difficulty level, nonce, etc.), time-stamp, Merkle tree root, etc.
• Transaction-specific Information: This information includes all transaction-data, along with its
associated Merkle tree details (except its root).
Transaction-data may have different semantics depending on its application domain. One may
use different data structure (e.g., bucket [41]) for transaction-records for the optimization of
blockchain-structure. An example of a generic block structure is depicted in Figure 6.
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Block’s Specific Information
Block Header Information
Transactions 
Information
Block Number Block Height
Version
Hash of BlockHeader
HashPointer of 
Previous block
Mining  Specific 
Information
TimeStamp
Merkle Root
Tx1
H1 H2 H3 H4 H7 H8H5 H6
H56 H78
H1……4 H5 ……..8
Nonce
H12 H34
Tx2 Tx3 Tx4 Tx5 Tx6 Tx7 Tx8
Figure 6. A Generic Block Structure.
Let us now describe how transaction-data (numerical, string, etc.) in blocks can be abstracted,
enabling one to design blockchains at various levels of abstractions with precision tuning.
5.1.1. Blockchain in Interval Domain
The interval abstract domain [13] is defined by I =
{
[l, h] | l ∈ Z∪ {−∞}, h ∈ Z∪ {+∞}, l ≤ h
}
∪⊥.
Given a set of integers X, this domain approximates X by a pair [l, h] where l and h represents minimal
and maximal element in X respectively. For example, the set {2, 1, 100, 4} is approximated by [1, 100].
Let Lc = 〈℘(R),⊆, ∅,R,∩,∪〉 and LI = 〈I,v,⊥, [−∞,+∞],u,unionsq〉 be the concrete lattice of the
powerset of numerical values R and the abstract lattice corresponding to the domain of intervals I
respectively, where
[l1, h1] v [l2, h2] ⇐⇒ l2 6 l1 ∧ h2 > h1
[l1, h1] u [l2, h2] = [max(l1 l2), min(h1 h2)]
[l1, h1] unionsq [l2, h2] = [min(l1, l2), max(h1 h2)]
The correspondence between Lc and LI is defined by Galois connections 〈Lc, αI, γI, LI〉, depicted
in Figure 7, where ∀S ∈ ℘(Z) and ∀v ∈ I:
αI(S) =

⊥ if S = ∅
[l, h] if round_down(min(S)) = l ∧ round_up(max(S)) = h
[−∞, h] if @min(S) ∧ round_up(max(S)) = h
[l, +∞] if round_down(min(S)) = l ∧ @max(S)
[−∞, +∞] if @min(S) ∧ @max(S);
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γI(v) =

∅ if v = ⊥
{k ∈ R | l ≤ k ≤ h} if v = [l, h]
{k ∈ R | k ≤ h} if v = [−∞, h]
{k ∈ R | l ≤ k} if v = [l, +∞]
R if v = [+∞, −∞].
∅
{0.0} ...{1.56}... ...{2.01} . . ....{-1.87}...{-2.12}.... . .
. . . {-2.12, -1.87} . . .{1.56, 2.0}. . .
. . .
R
αI
γI
⊥
[0, 0] [1, 1] [2, 2] . . .[-1, -1][-2, -2]. . .
[-2, -1] [-1, 0] [0, 1] [1, 2]. . . . . .
. . .
[-∞, +∞]
Figure 7. Galois connection between Lc and LI.
Given a concrete block, its corresponding abstract version by replacing all concrete information
with intervals is depicted in Figure 8:
Merkle Root
H
.  
 . 
   
.
.     .    .
Merkle Root
H1H2
[-2,7] [75,150]
. . .
.  
 . 
 . 
  .
. . .
10075 150 120
H5 H6 H7 H8
H5.. H8
5 -2 7
H1 H2 H3 H4
H1.. H4
3
.     .    .
Concrete Abstract
Figure 8. Abstract Block in Interval Domain.
5.1.2. Blockchain in String Abstract Domain
In this section, we present abstract domains for string data. Although various abstract domains
exist, let us recall from [42] two among them: “Prefix and Suffix” and “Bricks”. Given an alphabet Σ
consisting of characters, a string is a sequence (possibly infinite) of elements in Σ. Let us consider S=Σ∗,
which is the set of all possible strings of any length (possibly infinite) generated from Σ. Formally,
the concrete string domain is represented in the form of the lattice: Lc= 〈℘(S),⊆, ∅, S,∪,∩〉.
Prefix and Suffix Abstract Domain
A prefix x is an abstraction of a set of strings (including the string x itself) which begin with x
followed by other characters. Formally, the prefix abstract domain is represented by the abstract lattice
LA=〈A,v,⊥,>,unionsq,u〉whereA = Σ∗ ∪ {⊥}. Given two prefixes x, y ∈ A, the partial order v is defined as:
x v y iff len(x) ≥ len(y)∧∀i ∈ [0, len(y) − 1] : x[i] = y[i]
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where len(a) returns the number of characters in ‘a’. In other words, y is greater than x iff y is the
prefix of x. Observe that the top element > inA is the empty prefix . The meet operation u and join
operation unionsq in is defined as:
u(x1, x2)=

x1 if x1 v x2
x2 if x2 v x1
⊥ Otherwise
unionsq(x1, x2)=

x1 if x2 v x1
x2 if x1 v x2
> Otherwise
Therefore, the Galois connection between Lc and LA is established as 〈Lc, αA, γA, LA〉, where
∀X ∈ ℘(S) : αA(X) = unionsqx∈Xα(x) and α(x) = x
and
∀v ∈ A : γA(v) = {s ∈ S | prefix(s) = v}
The suffix domain is constructed in the similar way. Given a concrete block, its corresponding
abstract version in the prefix domain is depicted in Figure 9.
Merkle
Root
H12H34
H1 H2 H3 H4
Aldra Aldona Madelena Madelee
. . .
. .
 .
. . .
Merkle
Root
H1H2
Ald* Madele*
. . .
.  
 . 
 . 
  .
. . .
Concrete Abstract
Figure 9. Abstract Block in Prefix Domain.
Bricks Abstract Domain
Bricks abstract domain [42] is defined with an aim to capture both inclusion and order amongst
characters, using regular expressions [43]. A brick is defined as an element of the form B = [X]min,max
where X ∈ ℘(S). Both min and max are positive integer values which represent that all strings are built
by combining (in order) the strings in X taking each of them between min and max times altogether.
For example, [{“so”, “le”}]1,2 = {so, le, soso, lele, sole, leso}.
In bricks abstract domain, a set of strings is approximated by a combination of bricks. For example,
[{“manage”}]0,1 [{“ment”}]1,1 = {ment, management}, where [{“manage”}]0,1 concretizes to {, “manage”}
and [{“ment”}]1,1 concretizes to {“ment”}.
Formally, the abstract domain of bricks is defined as: BR = B
∗
; that is, the set of all finite
sequences of bricks. The abstract partial order in bricks domain is 〈BR,v,⊥,>,u,unionsq〉. The partial
order vB on two bricks [X1]min1,max1 , [X2]min2,max2 ∈ B is defined as [X1]min1,max1 vB [X2]min2,max2 ⇐⇒
(X1 ⊆ X2 ∧min1 ≥ min2 ∧max1 ≤ max2) ∨ [X2]min2,max2 = >B ∨ [X1]min1,max1 = ⊥B. The partial order
v between two lists of bricks L1, L2 ∈ BR is defined as follows: L1 v L2 ⇐⇒ (L1 = ⊥ ∨ L2 =
>∨∀i ∈ [1 . . . n] : L1[i] ≤ L2[i]). An upper bound operator is defined as unionsq(L1, L2) = LR[1]LR[2] . . . LR[n]
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where ∀i ∈ [1 . . . n]: LR[i] = unionsqB(L1[i], L2[i]) and unionsqB is defined as unionsqB([X1]min1,max1 , [X2]min2,max2)=[X1 ∪
X2]minimum(min1,min2),maximum(max1,max2). Similarly, a lower bound operator u is defined. This way,
blockchains can be designed in an abstract domain at various precisions levels. Although we have
shown abstract blockchains in non-relational abstract domains only, relational abstractions, such as
octagons, polyhedra, etc., may be used in specific contexts.
Observation: Processing speed in abstract blockchain may vary depending on the degree of abstraction
used. For example, the use of relational abstract domains such as polyhedra domain, although more
precise, may exhibits high computation cost (O(2n) for n-dimensional data). On the other hand, the use
of non-relation domains such as an interval domain may result into high processing speed (O(n)) by
compromising precision of the transaction-records. The proposed model supports the use of different
abstract domains in different blockchain networks across the hierarchy.
5.2. Horizontal vs. Vertical Abstraction
In case of thin clients or lightweight nodes with limited resources, the nodes only store a piece
of data only relevant to them, rather than storing the entire blockchain [9]. For example, the piece of
information may include only block headers and transactions relevant to the nodes. In other words,
such slice of information can be viewed as a vertical abstraction. The limitation is that these kind
of nodes do not contribute to the security of the system and they heavily depend on other fully
validating nodes.
In contrast to the vertical abstraction, our proposal can be considered as a kind of horizontal
abstraction where multiple records are abstracted resulting into a reduction of the number of blocks in
the blockchain.
A hybrid abstraction can also be constructed combining the above two when to deal with scalability
covering large geographical area with a number of thin clients involved in the system.
5.3. Consensus Mechanism
Let BChl be a blockchain maintained by l-th peer-to-peer network PP
h
l at hierarchy level h, where l =
1, . . . , nh. At lower level h = 1, the set of networks is PP1 = {PP11, PP12, . . . , PP1n1 }. Given k-th subset
Sk ⊆ PP1, one representative member (who acts as leader) from each network in Sk together forms
a network PP2k at the next level of hierarchy h = 2, where k = 1, . . . , n2. Therefore, at level h = 2,
the set of networks is PP2 = {PP21, PP22, . . . , PP2n2 }. Following similar approach, networks at subsequent
levels are formed. Each network follows traditional consensus algorithm in building and maintaining
local blockchain.
Role of Leader Participating in Multilevel Blockchain
Multilevel blockchains are useful in dealing with large volume of data generated across the globe.
Since leaders from a subset of networks at level h is also participating into another network at level
h + 1, such nodes are fully responsible to maintain data-consistency among blockchains across the
levels. To preserve data semantics, a leader should listen a number of transactions {τi} (which are
mined in the blockchain at level h) for wait-time δ and then broadcast a transaction τ (which is a sound
approximation of {τi}) in the (h + 1)-level network. However, δ can be varied to obtain different
precision depending on the applications or the network latency and throughput.
The most important feature in such multilevel hierarchy is the ability to ensure soundness of
the information as we move towards the higher level of the hierarchy compromising the precision
of information. Consider BChil and BC
h j
k such that hi 6 h j and there exists a common node (leader)
participating in both the networks at levels hi and h j. The soundness is guaranteed iff:
∀x ∈ BChil ,∃y ∈ BC
h j
k : x ⊆ γ(y) (1)
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There are many consensus mechanisms which are currently in use by blockchains, including PoW
(Proof of Work), PoS (Proof of Stake), DPoS (Delegated Proof of Stake), PBFT (Practical Byzantine
Fault Tolerance), PoB (Proof of Bandwidth), PoET (Proof of Elapsed Time), PoA(Proof of Authority)
and many more [44–46] to validate blocks. Two most popular blockchain systems—Bitcoin and
Ethereum—use the PoW mechanism. Due to huge energy consumption in PoW, Ethereum is now
trying to adopt the alternative PoS mining approach. Moreover, Ethereum also incorporates PoA
mechanism (i.e., Kovan public test chain). The existing consensus algorithms are powerful enough
to deal with the situation in presence of nodes-/links-failure or even in presence of Byzantine faults.
In case of our proposed multilevel blockchains systems, existing consensus algorithms can easily be
adopted. In fact, the algorithm will prefer to adopt a mechanism to change leaders participating across
the levels in the hierarchy, in case of suspicious behaviours of the current leaders.
5.4. Blockchain in Use
Given a blockchain at level h which contains a number of numerical values in its blocks, one can
easily lift these information to an abstract form representing their properties of interest at level h+ 1.
For example, a set of numerical values can be replaced by an interval as defined by the Galosis
connection 〈Lc, αI, γI, LI〉. Given an abstract blockchain BCA at level h+1 , the verification operation
for an element x in BCA is defined below:
Search(x, BCA)=

True if ∃ [x, x] ∈ BCA
False if ∀ [li, hi] ∈ BCA : x < li ∨ x > hi
Maybe Otherwise
Observe that, as the abstraction is sound, the possible results of Search operation always
guarantees the soundness. That is, if the Search operation returns “False” in the higher level, there exist
no transaction in the lower level satisfying the the same property. Formally,
∀BC ∈ γ(BCA) : Search(x, BC) ∈ γ(Search(x, BCa)) (2)
where γ is the concretization function. Observe that BC ∈ γ(BCA) satisfies Equation (1). According
to Equation (2), the Search operation may result into different cases, depicted in Table 1, due to
imprecision introduced in the abstract domain. Observe that the last two cases never occur due
to soundness of the Search operation defined in Equation (2) as per the abstract boolean lattice in
Figure 10.
Observe that the verification at higher level of the hierarchy may lead to “Maybe” due to
abstractions. However, one can traverse down the hierarchy to the lowest-level subnetwork and
perform concrete-level verification.
Maybe
True False
⊥
Figure 10. Abstract Boolean Lattice.
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Table 1. Various Cases of Search Operation in Blockchain.
Cases Data Exists inConcrete Blockchain?
Data Exists in
Abstract Blockchain? Wheather Possible or Not?
1 True True Yes
2 False False Yes
3 True Maybe Yes
4 False Maybe Yes
5 False True No
6 True False No
6. Implementation and Experimental Results
We have implemented our proposal considering a simple two-level hierarchy of blockchain-networks,
where three local networks N1, N2 and N3 at level-1 are communicating with level-2 network Na.
A pictorial view of the system is depicted in Figure 11. We have used Ethereum client geth to build
these networks where each network maintains its own blockchain separately.
Figure 11. Prototypical Setup.
We have chosen a set of leaders (labelled with L), one from each local network Ni (i ∈ 1 . . . 3).
The task of a leader is to listen a set T of its local transactions over δwait-time and to initiate an abstract
transaction ta (which contains abstraction of T) in the network Na. Since our prime objective is
to show the effectiveness of abstractions as a way to improve scalabality, in this experiment we
have considered transactions consisting of numerical values in the form 〈transactionid, value〉 pair.
For abstraction, we have considered the Galois connection between numerical values domain and
interval abstract domain.
The functionality of leader is implemented using JavaScript which interacts with two kinds of
smart contracts, one for level-1 networks Ni and other for level-2 network Na. The responsibilities
of these smart contracts are to initiate transactions in their respective networks and to return state
information to the leader script in order to assist the abstraction process. The action performed by
the leader script is depicted in Algorithm 1. Steps 5–8 are executed after every δ wait-time as per
the condition specified in step 4. Observed that step 8 determines whether there exist some concrete
transactions in the concrete blockchain (maintained by Ni) whose abstract form yet to take place in the
abstract blockchain (maintained by Na). Steps 6 and 7 extract information from concrete and abstract
blockchains respectively with the help of their respective smart contracts. Steps 9 and 10 are responsible
to apply abstraction on unattended concrete transactions and to initiate abstract transaction in Na.
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Algorithm 1: LeaderAction
Inputs : Local Network ID i, Addresses ANi and ANa of Smart Contracts deployed in Ni and
Na respectively, and wait-time δ
Output : Abstract Transaction in Na after every δ wait-time
1 startTime = getCurrentTime();
2 while true do
3 currentTime = getCurrentTime();
4 if currentTime > startTime + δ then
5 startTime = currentTime;
6 concreteInfo = getConcreteInfo(ANi );
7 abstractInfo = getAbstractInfo(ANa , i);
8 if concreteInfo < γ(abstractInfo) then
9 absVal = applyAbstraction(ANi , concreteInfo, abstractInfo);
10 initiateAbstractTransaction(ANa , absVal);
For the experiment purpose, we have added more than 40,000 transactions (with values ranging
from 100 to 2000) generated randomly in each local network at level-1. Table 2 depicts the experimental
results which indicate the variation of blockchain-size both in concrete and abstract domains w.r.t.
different wait-time (δ) for leaders and different transaction-rate in local networks. The values indicate
an average taken over 60 min of observation. This is important to note that since we automate the
creation of local transaction randomly, there is a slight variation in the number of blocks and data-size
for a given transaction-rate. The results in column 9 clearly show a significant reduction of the data-size
and the number of blocks in the abstract domain w.r.t. its concrete counterpart, as we increase δ. This is
because, as leader waits for larger δ, more number of local transaction-records are being abstracted
into a single transaction. The amount of the gas consumption in the execution of both smart contracts
(local and abstract agents) are shown in columns 5 and 8 respectively.
Table 2. Concrete vs. Abstract Blockchain.
δ
(sec)
Trans.
Rate
Concrete Blockchain
(N1 + N2 + N3)
Abstract Blockchain % of
Data-Size
ReductionData Size
(bytes) Blocks
Gas
Unit
Data Size
(bytes) Blocks
Gas
Unit
2
0.8 1,793,118 752 290,018,052 423,444 415 64,383,622 76.39
1 2,222,252 802 376,017,792 455,207 450 68,488,727 79.52
1.25 2,908,553 1,122 637,439,592 642,433 603 85,578,176 77.91
3
0.8 1,758,420 718 286,315,196 371,572 364 57,597,793 78.87
1 2,238,783 837 375,500,652 446,487 442 65,240,401 80.06
1.25 2,922,238 1,117 611,331,736 570,512 571 78,130,294 80.48
5
0.8 1,761,710 702 285,278,812 324,078 320 50,817,916 81.6
1 2,271,361 941 381,924,264 433,224 458 60,367,976 80.93
1.25 2,856,380 1,051 533,500,956 454,180 479 62,558,909 84.1
6
0.8 1,788,095 758 286,096,610 343,825 345 51,486,689 80.77
1 2,284,781 918 386,398,262 396,471 406 54,157,749 82.65
1.25 2,822,752 984 518,845,796 400,365 430 54,536,705 85.82
7
0.8 1,783,445 731 286,144,944 306,870 307 46,327,839 82.79
1 2,245,741 840 397,938,268 355,289 384 48,614,951 84.18
1.25 2,790,292 934 509,479,548 356,596 378 49,091,622 87.22
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A sample instance occurred during our experiment is shown in Table 3 which describes how
the leader performs the abstraction of local blockchain transactions. The first column of every row
represents the list of transactions mined into local blockchain for δ = 5 s. The second column represents
its equivalent abstract form in the form of interval which is generated by the leader in network
N1. Observe that given a list of transactions {“32134”: 138, “32135”: 636, “32136”: 1365} and its
corresponding abstract form [“32134”, “32136”]: [138, 1365], both the operations Search(636, [138,
1365]) and Search(640, [138, 1365]) result into “Maybe” according to its definition in Section 5.4.
Table 3. Concrete transactions and their abstract forms.
Sample Transactions Instances Mined in N1
for δ = 5 s and Trans. Rate = 1.25 Abstract Transaction
{“32129”: 773, “32130”: 485, “32131”: 1218, “32132”: 1452,
“32133”: 963}
[“32129”, “32133”] : [485, 1452]
{“32134”: 138, “32135”: 636, “32136”: 1365} [“32134”, “32136”] : [138, 1365]
{“32137”: 1231} [“32137”, “32137”] : [1231, 1231]
{“32138”: 1491, “32139”: 1910, “32140”: 1653, “32141”: 1007,
“32142”: 1474, “32143”: 701, “32144”: 467}
[“32138”, “32144”] : [467, 1910]
{“32145”: 1770, “32146”: 826, “32147”: 1645, “32148”: 143,
“32149”: 276, “32150”: 724}
[“32145”, “32150”] : [143, 1770]
Let us now illustrate the experimental results of the Search operations performed both in the
concrete and the abstract blockchains, depicted in Table 4. In the experiment, we have randomly
chosen a test dataset containing 500 transaction-records and we have categorized it into two halves:
(1) data that exists in the concrete blockchain, and (2) data that does not exist in the concrete blockchain
(shown in columns 3, 4, and 5). The result of Search operation on a test dataset by varying δ and
transaction-rate is shown in columns 6 and 7. The values of “Exact Discovery Rate (EDR)” are computed
from the transactions representing cases 1 and 2 of Table 1, whereas the values of “Partial Discovery
Rate (PDR)” are computed from the transactions representing case 3 of Table 1. Observe that, as δ
and transaction-rate increase, the percentage of EDR decreases due to increasing imprecision in the
abstract records.
Although the current result is showing high PDR, this can easily be reduced by tuning our
abstractions and by reducing wait-time δ. The use of the Abstract Interpretation framework enables
one to use different levels of abstractions, from coarse-grained to fine-grained, according to the need.
For example, as per the abstract lattice of interval domain, an integer x can be abstracted by [x, x]
or it can be abstracted by [∞,∞]. Moreover, the framework is powerful enough to consider various
abstract domains—either relational or non-relational or their combination. In general, the lowest-level
blockchains represent concrete transaction-data, while blockchains towards the higher-level by abstract
values with more degree of abstractions. Therefore, as we move towards the higher level, although the
performance of verification-result process increases, its effectiveness decreases accordingly. Interestingly,
the framework allows one to perform verification either at appropriate hierarchy-level depending on
the degree of precision one requires in the verification result or on the concrete blockchain at lowest
level by traversing down the hierarchy.
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Table 4. Verification results: Concrete vs. Abstract.
δ
Trans.
Rate No. of Inputs for Verification
Verification Results in
Concrete Blockchain(CB)
Verification Results in
Abstract Blockchain
No. of Inputs Exists in CB? % of EDR % of PDR
2
0.8 500 250 True 25.2 46250 False
1 500 250 True 20.2 48.8250 False
1.25 500 250 True 13.4 49.6250 False
5
0.8 500 250 True 19 48250 False
1 500 250 True 14.2 49.4250 False
1.25 500 250 True 17.2 49.8250 False
7
0.8 500 250 True 18.2 48.8250 False
1 500 250 True 12.8 49.2250 False
1.25 500 250 True 9.2 50250 False
7. Discussions
Although scalability is a major concern in decentralized peer-to-peer blockchain networks,
yet researchers paid little attention till the date. The existing solutions addressed this problem in
different directions: pruning out the old historical data to reduce data size in the network and in the
blockchain [21], improving consensus algorithm as a way to improve latency and throughput [22],
categorizing nodes in the network with predefined functionalities and enabling them to work in
a distributed manner [7], etc.
All the above-mentioned approaches although solve the scalability issue to some extent,
however their applicability is limited to specific application domains only. For example, the proposal
in [21] is designed very specifically for cryptocurrency and generation needs all historical records,
whereas the proposal in [22] is mainly concentrated on the consensus algorithm, showing that
improvement in scalability of the blockchain protocol is possible to the point where the consensus
latency is limited solely by the network diameter and the throughput bottleneck lies only in node
processing power. This is to observe that the scope of Bitcoin-NG differs from ours in the sense that
we have mainly concentrated to blockchain network structure, from mesh to hierarchical, and the
abstraction of the transaction-records.
A recently published work in march 2019 [28] differs from our proposal in many ways: (1) The work
focus exclusively in IoT systems that prefer to keep user’s key information, and hence may not fit
to other scenario in general. (2) They discriminate the participants, categorizing into device-layer,
fog-layer and cloud-layer nodes, with a varying computational capabilities. The task of each layer nodes
are predefined. For Example, the fog-layer nodes which lie in between device-layer and cloud layer,
act as security manager to record and verify transactions that include key management information
in this respective domain. Although the proposal is suitable for cross domain communications
respecting privacy issues, it does not address any scalability issue in presence of large-scale nodes in
the peer-to-peer network. Therefore, this is indeed interesting to see if the combination of these two
improves the individual results. This is our future plan.
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The hierarchical model proposed in this paper can be seen a generic model where the number of
levels in the hierarchy and the levels of abstractions can easily be varied based on the application need.
As we already mentioned before that the approach scale the system, alongside such partial views
towards higher levels of the hierarchy also facilitate to control the access of blockchains (and hence
blockchain records) differently to different groups of people or processes as per their access rights.
In fact, the support of policy specification deployed through smart contract can make this model
more powerful.
Because of the existence of multiple local blockchains (with different views of the global data),
the model enables to design Inter-organization Blockchain Communication. This can also be empowered
by allowing heterogeneous local blockchain networks to form a global view along the higher level of
the hierarchy establishing Cross Blockchain Compatibility [47]. There is a scope to improve reliability
in our proposal by considering multiple leaders across the hierarchical-levels, treating only one leader
among them as active and others as passive. On malfunctioning, a passive leader immediately changes
its state and replaces the malfunctioning-leader. Observe that all nodes, except leaders, need to
maintain only small-size local blockchain. The proposed approach is suitable not only for private or
consortium blockchain networks, but also for public blockchain networks. However, in case of a public
blockchain network, the following challenges need to be addressed: first, since there exist multiple
sub-networks across the hierarchy, there is a need to device a joining-policy for a node. This can be
resolved by categorizing nodes based on their IP address (to identify local network), expected role in
the network (to identify the hierarchy-level), etc. Second, as all nodes are treated equally in public
network, another critical issue is how to elect leaders who will form the bridge between networks
in two consecutive levels in the hierarchy. This may be resolved by adopting a suitable consensus
algorithm as per the requirements. This is worthwhile to note that traditional public blockchain
network is a specialized form of our model with single-level hierarchy.
8. Conclusions
In this paper, we introduced a hierarchical blockchain model powered by the Abstract Interpretation
framework. The primary objective of the proposal is to scale blockchain network, making it suitable to
fit into real-world organizational structures and providing a controlled environment for blockchain data.
The results obtained by our experiment show how the variation of wait-time (δ) and transaction-rate
affect the size reduction of blockchain when moving from concrete to abstract domains. The verification
result is also influenced by the degree of abstraction that we apply across the hierarchy. We are now
working on its possible extension to empower the model with access control policy specification
deployable through smart contracts, covering both static and dynamic access-control settings. On the
other hand, we’ll focus on the consensus mechanism to further improve the efficiency of the
proposed model.
Author Contributions: Conceptualization, A.C.; Formal analysis, R.H.; Software, S.S. and A.M.F.; Validation, S.S.
and A.M.F.; Writing—original draft, S.S. and A.M.F.; Writing—review & editing, A.C.
Funding: This work is partially supported by CINI Cybersecurity National Laboratory within the project
FilieraSicura. The second author is supported by Visvesvaraya PhD Scheme, Ministry of Electronics and
Information Technology (MeitY), Government of India.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflicts of interest.
References
1. Nakamoto, S. Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System. Cryptography Mailing List. Available online:
https://metzdowd.com (accessed on 10 January 2019).
2. Pilkington, M. Blockchain Technology: Principles and Applications. In Handbook of Research on Digital
Transformations; Olleros, F.X., Zhegu, M., Eds.; Edward Elgar: Cheltenham, UK, 2016.
3. Miraz, M.H.; Ali, M. Applications of blockchain technology beyond cryptocurrency arXiv 2018, arXiv:1801.03528.
Appl. Sci. 2019, 9, 2343 18 of 20
4. Mallard, A.; Méadel, C.; Musiani, F. The paradoxes of distributed trust: Peer-to-peer architecture and user
confidence in Bitcoin. J. Peer Prod. 2014. Available online: https://hal-mines-paristech.archives-ouvertes.fr/
hal-00985707 (accessed on 15 February 2019).
5. Croman, K.; Decker, C.; Eyal, I.; Gencer, A.E.; Juels, A.; Kosba, A.; Miller, A.; Saxena, P.; Shi, E.;
Sirer, E.G.; et al. On scaling decentralized blockchains. In Proceedings of the International Conference
on Financial Cryptography and Data Security, Christ Church, Barbados, 22–26 February 2016; Springer:
Berlin/Heidelberg, Germany, 2016; pp. 106–125.
6. Zheng, Z.; Xie, S.; Dai, H.N.; Chen, X.; Wang, H. Blockchain challenges and opportunities: A survey. Int. J.
Web Grid Serv. 2018, 14, 352–375. [CrossRef]
7. Novo, O. Blockchain meets IoT: An architecture for scalable access management in IoT. IEEE Internet Things J.
2018, 5, 1184–1195. [CrossRef]
8. Karafiloski, E.; Mishev, A. Blockchain solutions for big data challenges: A literature review. In Proceedings of
the 17th IEEE EUROCON International Conference on Smart Technologies, Ohrid, Macedonia, 6–8 July 2017;
pp. 763–768.
9. Narayanan, A.; Bonneau, J.; Felten, E.; Miller, A.; Goldfeder, S. Bitcoin and Cryptocurrency
Technologies—A Comprehensive Introduction; Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, USA, 2016.
10. Conti, M.; Kumar, E.S.; Lal, C.; Ruj, S. A survey on security and privacy issues of bitcoin. IEEE Commun.
Surv. Tutor. 2018, 20, 3416–3452. [CrossRef]
11. Zhang, Y.; Kasahara, S.; Shen, Y.; Jiang, X.; Wan, J. Smart Contract-Based Access Control for the Internet of
Things. IEEE Internet Things J. 2019, 6, 1594–1605. [CrossRef]
12. Alharby, M.; van Moorsel, A. A Systematic Mapping Study on Current Research Topics in Smart Contracts.
Int. J. Comput. Sci. Inf. Technol. (IJCSIT) 2017, 9, 151–164. [CrossRef]
13. Cousot, P.; Cousot, R. Abstract interpretation: A unified lattice model for static analysis of programs by
construction or approximation of fixpoints. In Proceedings of the 4th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium
on Principles of Programming Languages, Los Angeles, CA, USA, 17–19 January 1977; ACM Press: New York,
NY, USA,1977; pp. 238–252.
14. Wang, S.; Zhang, Y.; Zhang, Y. A Blockchain-Based Framework for Data Sharing with Fine-grained Access
Control in Decentralized Storage Systems. IEEE Access 2018, 6, 38437–38450. [CrossRef]
15. Liang, X.; Zhao, J.; Shetty, S.; Liu, J.; Li, D. Integrating blockchain for data sharing and collaboration in
mobile healthcare applications. In Proceedings of the 28th Annual International Symposium on Personal,
Indoor, and Mobile Radio Communications (PIMRC) Montreal, QC, Canada, 8–13 October 2017; pp. 1–5.
16. Ekblaw, A.; Azaria, A.; Halamka, J.D.; Lippman, A. MedRec: Using Blockchain for Medical Data Access
and Permission Management. In Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Open and Big Data,
OBD 2016, Vienna, Austria, 22–24 August 2016; pp. 25–30.
17. de la Rosa, J.L.; Torres-Padrosa, V.; El-Fakdi, A.; Gibovic, D.; Hornyak, O.; Maicher, L.; Miralles, F. A Survey
of Blockchain Technologies for Open Innovation. In Proceedings of the World Open Innovation Conference,
San Francisco, CA, USA, 13–15 December 2017.
18. Tsilidou, A.; Foroglou, G. Further applications of the blockchain. In Proceedings of the 12th Student
Conference on Managerial Science and Technology, Athens, Greece, 14 May 2015.
19. Belotti, M.; Bozic, N.; Pujolle, G.; Secci, S. A Vademecum on Blockchain Technologies: When, Which and How.
Available online: https://hal.sorbonne-universite.fr/hal-01870617 (accessed on 15 April 2019).
20. Muller, C.; Hasic, D. Blockchain: Technology and Applications. In Proceedings of the SE Seminar aus
Informatik, Department of Computer Sciences, University of Salzburg, Salzburg, Austria, 29 July 2016.
21. Bruce, J. The Mini-Blockchain Scheme. White Paper. 2014. Available online: http://cryptonite.info/files/mbc-
scheme-rev3.pdf (accessed on 15 January 2019).
22. Eyal, I.; Gencer, A.E.; Sirer, E.G.; Van Renesse, R. Bitcoin-NG: A Scalable Blockchain Protocol. In Proceedings
of the 13th {USENIX} Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation(NSDI), Santa Clara,
CA, USA, 16–18 March 2016.
23. Bandara, E.; Ng, W.K.; Zoysa, K.D.; Fernando, N.; Tharaka, S.; Maurakirinathan, P.; Jayasuriya, N.
Mystiko—Blockchain Meets Big Data. In Proceedings of the 2018 IEEE International Conference on Big Data
(Big Data), Seattle, WA, USA, 10–13 December 2018; pp. 3024–3032.
Appl. Sci. 2019, 9, 2343 19 of 20
24. McConaghy, T.; Marques, R.; Müller, A.; De Jonghe, D.; McConaghy, T.; McMullen, G.; Henderson, R.;
Bellemare, S.; Granzotto, A. BigchainDB: A Scalable Blockchain Database. White Paper, ascribe GmbH, Berlin,
Germany, 12 February 2016. Available online: http://cryptochainuni.com/wp-content/uploads/bigchaindb-
whitepaper-DRAFT.pdf (accessed on 19 January 2019).
25. Sahoo, M.S.; Baruah, P.K. HBasechainDB—A Scalable Blockchain Framework on Hadoop Ecosystem.
In Supercomputing Frontiers; Springer International Publishing: Cham, Switzerland, 2018; pp. 18–29.
26. Dorri, A.; Kanhere, S.S.; Jurdak, R. Blockchain in internet of things: Challenges and solutions. arXiv 2016,
arXiv:1608.05187.
27. Torun, A. Hierarchical Blockchain Architecture for a Relaxed Hegemony on Cadastre Data Management and
Update: A Case Study for Turkey. In Proceedings of the UCTEA International Geographical Information
Systems Congress 2017, Adana, Turkey, 5–18 November 2017.
28. Ma, M.; Shi, G.; Li, F. Privacy-Oriented Blockchain-based Distributed Key Management Architecture for
Hierarchical Access Control in the IoT Scenario. IEEE Access 2019, 7, 34045–34059. [CrossRef]
29. Hwang, D.; Choi, J.; Kim, K.H. Dynamic Access Control Scheme for IoT Devices using Blockchain.
In Proceedings of the 2018 International Conference on Information and Communication Technology
Convergence (ICTC), Jeju, Korea, 17–19 October 2018; pp. 713–715.
30. Zanioli, M.; Ferrara, P.; Cortesi, A. SAILS: Static analysis of information leakage with sample. In Proceedings
of the ACM Symposium on Applied Computing 2012, Trento, Italy, 26–30 March 2012; pp. 1308–1313.
31. Mandal, A.; Cortesi, A.; Ferrara, P.; Panarotto, F.; Spoto, F. Vulnerability analysis of android auto infotainment
apps. In Proceedings of the ACM International Conference on Computing Frontiers, CF 2018, Ischia, Italy,
8–10 May 2018; pp. 183–190.
32. Halder, R.; Cortesi, A. Abstract interpretation of database query languages. Comput. Lang. Syst. Struct. 2012,
38, 123–157. [CrossRef]
33. Jana, A.; Halder, R.; Kalahasti, A.; Ganni, S.; Cortesi, A. Extending Abstract Interpretation to Dependency
Analysis of Database Applications. IEEE Trans. Softw. Eng. 2019, in press.
34. Pollet, I.; Charlier, B.L.; Cortesi, A. Distinctness and Sharing Domains for Static Analysis of Java
Programs. In ECOOP 2001—Object-Oriented Programming, Proceedings of the 15th European Conference,
Budapest, Hungary, 18–22 June 2001; Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Springer: Berlin/Heidelberg,
Germany, 2001; Volume 2072, pp. 77–98.
35. Backes, M.; Cortesi, A.; Maffei, M. Causality-based Abstraction of Multiplicity in Security Protocols.
In Proceedings of the 20th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium, CSF 2007, Venice, Italy,
6–8 July 2007; pp. 355–369.
36. Mandal, A.K.; Panarotto, F.; Cortesi, A.; Ferrara, P.; Spoto, F. Static Analysis of Android Auto Infotainment
and ODB-II Apps. Softw. Pract. Exp. 2019, in press. [CrossRef]
37. Cousot, P.; Cousot, R. Systematic design of program analysis frameworks. In Proceedings of the 6th
ACM SIGACT-SIGPLAN Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages, San Antonio, TX, USA,
29–31 January 1979; ACM Press: New York, NY, USA, 1979; pp. 269–282.
38. Cousot, P.; Halbwachs, N. Automatic Discovery of Linear Restraints Among Variables of a Program.
In Proceedings of the the Fifth Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages, Tucson,
AZ, USA, 23–25 January 1978; pp. 84–96.
39. Miné, A. A New Numerical Abstract Domain Based on Difference-Bound Matrices. In Proceedings of the
Second Symposium on Programs as Data Objects, Aarhus, Denmark, 21–23 May 2001; Springer-Verlag:
London, UK, 2001; pp. 155–172.
40. Minè, A. The Octagon Abstract Domain. High.-Order Symb. Comput. 2006, 19, 31–100. [CrossRef]
41. Chen, W.; Zheng, Z.; Ma, M.; He, P.; Zheng, P.; Zhou, Y. Poster: Efficient Blockchain-Based Software Systems
via Hierarchical Bucket Tree. In Proceedings of the 2018 IEEE/ACM 40th International Conference on
Software Engineering: Companion (ICSE-Companion), Gothenburg, Sweden, 27 May–3 June 2018.
42. Costantini, G.; Ferrara, P.; Cortesi, A. A suite of abstract domains for static analysis of string values.
Softw. Pract. Exp. 2015, 45, 245–287. [CrossRef]
43. Qin, S.; Qiu, Z. Formal Methods and Software Engineering. In Proceedings of the 13th International
Conference on Formal Engineering Methods (ICFEM), Durham, UK, 26–28 October 2011; Volume 6991.
44. Nguyen, T.; Kim, K. A survey about consensus algorithms used in Blockchain. J. Inf. Process. Syst. 2018,
14, 101–128.
Appl. Sci. 2019, 9, 2343 20 of 20
45. Chaudhry, N.; Murtaza Yousaf, M. Consensus Algorithms in Blockchain: Comparative Analysis,
Challenges and Opportunities. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Open Source Systems and
Technologies (ICOSST), Lahore, Pakistan, 19–21 December 2018; pp. 54–63.
46. Bach, L.M.; Mihaljevic, B.; Zagar, M. Comparative analysis of blockchain consensus algorithms.
In Proceedings of the International Convention on Information and Communication Technology,
Electronics and Microelectronics (MIPRO), Opatija, Croatia, 21–25 May 2018; pp. 1545–1550.
47. Goyal, S. Blockchain Future-Cross Blockchain Compatibility. 2018. Available online: https://cryptodigestnews.
com/ (accessed on 19 January 2019).
© 2019 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access
article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution
(CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
